NRIC saga: Govt shouldn’t come down like ‘a tonne of bricks’ on civil servants involved, says SM Teo

SINGAPORE – While the civil servants involved in the NRIC unmasking saga have caused public anxiety and need to be held accountable for their actions, the Government should not come down on them “like a tonne of bricks”, said Senior Minister Teo Chee Hean.

“Don’t go in with a big bazooka and flatten everybody,” he said in Parliament, adding that accountability has to be done in a fair and balanced way to the individuals.

SM Teo was responding to clarifications raised by 12 MPs on March 6 after he gave a ministerial statement on a review panel that looked into the lapses in communication between the Accounting and Corporate Regulatory Authority (Acra) and the Ministry of Digital Development and Information (MDDI) that led to the incident in December 2024.

A misunderstanding of an internal government circular and lack of coordination between staff had led to the disclosure of full NRIC numbers on a new business portal called Bizfile.

The review flagged six shortcomings that led to the mass disclosure – including insufficient information sharing within Acra, lack of clarity in its policy communications by MDDI, and poor communication with the public.

MPs like Ms Jessica Tan (East Coast GRC) and Ms Tin Pei Ling (MacPherson) raised concerns about how the penalties might cause public servants to be overly cautious and avoid taking risks, which can stymie innovation.

The officers and senior management involved in the missteps could face consequences such as counselling, retraining and reductions in their performance grade and performance-based payments.

SM Teo said: “We should deal with them fairly and in accordance with the public sector’s disciplinary processes. This is something that will give assurance to officers that just because something has become publicly known and caused public anxiety, that we won’t come down on them in an unfair way.”

The Government would have to evaluate their actions, what they should have done, and what was the intent behind it before deciding on the appropriate action to be taken.

“That is the way we should continue within the public service, so that the public service can continue to do the things they need to do for us – including taking calculated risks if there’s a need to,” said SM Teo.

Political office-holders like Second Minister for Finance Indranee Rajah, who oversees Acra, and Digital Development and Information Minister Josephine Teo, who oversees the Smart Nation initiative under MDDI, will also have to shoulder responsibility for the organisations under their charge.

“The Prime Minister will take into account this incident in his evaluation of the ministers,” added SM Teo.

Workers’ Party (WP) chairwoman Sylvia Lim (Aljunied GRC) also asked about Prime Minister Lawrence Wong’s responsibility over the incident, given that he is also the Minister of Finance.

SM Teo pointed out that PM Wong has to delegate responsibilities to his ministers.

“If the Prime Minister tries to be responsible for everything, he would not be able to function at all. One of the responsibilities of the Prime Minister is to know when he should delegate, and when he should intervene,” said SM Teo.

He added: “I’m also glad to note that Ms Sylvia Lim takes accountability, especially accountability of leaders of organisations, as something which is very serious and which should be accepted when mistakes are made.”

Addressing questions on whether issues like personal data protection and cyber security should be dealt with on an inter-ministry level involving senior political office-holders, SM Teo said that interagency coordination has to be done at the right level.

Policy issues are coordinated at the deputy prime minster and senior minister level, while implementation is usually coordinated by the relevant agencies. 

“If you try to do that kind of coordination, day-to-day action at the DPM or SM level, I think you’ll end up with a major bottleneck, and (the system) will not work properly,” said SM Teo.

In asking if the Government can do more to strengthen the security of online portals that provide access to personal data, Dr Tan Wu Meng (Jurong GRC) pointed out that Acra had outsourced its portal security to a vendor, which then outsourced security penetration tests to another vendor.

However, it was found that security features for the Bizfile portal were not adequately implemented.

Dr Tan asked if the same vendors are providing services to other government portals or organisations.

SM Teo said that vendors are not perfect and can make mistakes. But there is a process for selecting vendors, and if a vendor is found to not have fulfilled responsibilities properly, that will be taken into account in future awarding of tenders.

There were also concerns that cyber criminals have scraped the database of unmasked NRIC numbers from the Bizfile portal for profit.

WP MP Gerald Giam (Aljunied GRC) said the portal had received more than 500,000 searches for NRIC numbers over five days in December, and asked if the Government had been monitoring the Dark Web for sale of the personal information.

Non-Constituency MP Leong Mun Wai wanted to know if there was evidence to suggest a compromise of full NRIC numbers “on a large scale”.

SM Teo said the Government monitors the Dark Web for a variety of things, including the Bizfile incident, and has not seen any sale of NRIC numbers.

https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/nric-saga-govt-shouldnt-come-down-like-a-tonne-of-bricks-on-civil-servants-involved-says-sm-teo

No 'deliberate wrongdoing' by MDDI, ACRA in unmasking of NRIC numbers: Review panel

SINGAPORE: There was no "deliberate wrongdoing or wilful inaction" by government officers involved in the events leading to full National Registration Identity Card (NRIC) numbers being displayed on a business portal last December.

A report by the review panel set up to look into the incident said on Monday (Mar 3) that it was a "confluence of several shortcomings" that resulted in NRIC numbers being unmasked on the Accounting and Corporate Regulatory Authority's (ACRA) Bizfile portal.

The panel, chaired by the head of civil service Leo Yip, was asked to review the government's policy on responsible use of NRIC numbers, determine what led to the Bizfile incident and identify learning points to avoid similar incidents in future. 

"While the panel did not find any factual evidence of deliberate wrongdoing or wilful inaction by the (Ministry of Digital Development and Information) and ACRA officers involved in this incident, it found several shortcomings by both ACRA and MDDI in this incident, which should have been avoided," the Prime Minister's Office said in a press release.

The panel submitted its report to Senior Minister and Minister-in-charge of the Smart Nation Group Teo Chee Hean on Feb 25. Prime Minister Lawrence Wong approved the report for public release on Feb 27. Mr Teo will deliver a ministerial statement on the report on Mar 6 in parliament.

ACRA, its parent ministry the Ministry of Finance, and MDDI accepted the panel's findings and laid out the steps being taken to address the shortcomings.

Last December, there was a public outcry over privacy concerns when queries made on ACRA's Bizfile portal produced full NRIC numbers for free in search results.

ACRA chief executive Chia-Tern Huey Min said a "lapse of coordination" and a misunderstanding led to the NRIC numbers being unmasked.

TIMELINE OF EVENTS

In August 2022, the former Smart Nation and Digital Government Office (SNDGO), which is now part of MDDI, began reviewing the policy on the use of NRIC numbers.

The intention was to stop the incorrect use of NRIC numbers for authentication and to move away from the use of partial NRIC numbers.

SNDGO issued a circular to government agencies in September 2023 addressing the first issue – the incorrect use of NRIC numbers for authentication. NRIC numbers are meant to identify people, rather than prove that they are who they claim to be.

Separate from the SNDGO's review, ACRA in early 2024 proposed that it start providing partial NRIC numbers instead of full NRIC numbers when users purchase a People Profile on the Bizfile portal.

SNDGO informed ACRA of plans to move away from using partial NRIC numbers, and ACRA decided not to make the change.

However, ACRA already misunderstood SNDGO's intentions at this stage. It believed that the long term intent was for public agencies to "unmask" NRIC numbers. 

SNDGO did not correct ACRA or clarify that stopping the use of partial NRIC numbers was not equivalent to unmasking and using full NRIC numbers.

"This contributed to subsequent misunderstandings between ACRA and MDDI," the review panel said in its report.

In July 2024, MDDI issued a circular to communicate its plan to stop using partial NRIC numbers internally and to stop introducing new uses of partial NRIC numbers both internally and externally.

For existing external uses of masked NRIC numbers, MDDI planned to collect information on use cases before developing plans on how to stop them.

MDDI conducted a briefing on the circular 11 days later, and two officers from ACRA who were not involved in the development of the new Bizfile portal attended the session.

A video recording of the briefing and a document with frequently asked questions were emailed to data governance teams the next day, but were not appended to the initial circular and were not shared with ACRA senior leadership.

Within ACRA, there were discussions about the potential sensitivity of showing full NRIC numbers in its People Search function, but the agency was "heavily influenced" by its earlier exchange with SNDGO, where the term "unmask" was used.

It also referenced a line in the July circular stating that agencies must cease the planned use of masked NRIC numbers in new digital products. Although Bizfile is not new, ACRA considered the updated portal to be a new digital product.

In email exchanges, MDDI told ACRA it could continue to use masked NRIC numbers "for now" but be prepared for the "eventual unmasking". MDDI used "unmask" as shorthand for stopping the use of masked NRIC numbers.

ACRA misunderstood that to mean that masked NRIC numbers could be used on its old Bizfile portal, but the full number would need to be shown on its new portal as soon as possible.

"Both sides did not pick up that ACRA had misunderstood the (circular) because both sides did not engage each other in depth on what they meant in their emails, which might have clarified the misunderstanding," the report said.

As a result, when the new portal was launched on Dec 9 last year, full NRIC numbers were displayed in the search results of People Search.

Three days later, agencies began to receive media queries and feedback from members of the public. The search function was disabled late on Dec 13, and MDDI said NRIC numbers are not meant to be private, and that it intended to change the practice of masking NRIC numbers.

However, on Dec 19, ACRA's chief executive said the agency misunderstood MDDI and thought it should unmask NRIC numbers in the Bizfile portal.

The search function was revised and introduced on Dec 28, and NRIC numbers are no longer displayed in search results.

SIX SHORTCOMINGS FLAGGED

The report also highlighted six shortcomings by MDDI and ACRA.

1. MDDI should have been more precise in its July 2024 circular to reduce misunderstandings. For example, it could have been clearer in explaining that stopping the use of partial NRIC numbers did not mean using the full number. Key clarifications could have been appended to the initial circular.

But the panel acknowledged MDDI's extensive briefing to ensure its circular was properly understood, and that ACRA was the only agency rolling out a new portal and misunderstood the circular "to the extent that it did".

2. Information sharing within ACRA was insufficient, and contributed to the misunderstanding. Officers who attended the briefing or received the frequently asked questions document should have ensured that the information was disseminated as widely as the original circular, the panel said.

"As a result, ACRA continued to misinterpret the (circular), and had acted on incomplete information when it decided to disclose full NRIC numbers," the report said.

3. MDDI should have paid more attention to its implementation plan for more complex cases when it told agencies to stop introducing new use cases of partial NRIC numbers.

More guidance could help agencies understand how to stop the use of partial NRIC numbers and decide whether full NRIC numbers were necessary.

4. ACRA did not assess the proper balance between sharing full NRIC numbers and ensuring that they were not too readily accessible, contravening the government's internal rules on data management.

"As ACRA thought that the disclosure of full NRIC numbers was a central directive from MDDI, it had prioritised compliance over its internal concerns on displaying full NRIC numbers," said the report.

5. Certain security features for the People Search function were not adequately implemented. A review by GovTech found that some security features including CAPTCHA functionality - which differentiates humans from bots - were not properly implemented.

That means data may have been retrieved by bots from Dec 9 to Dec 13, before the function was taken down.

6. The response to public concerns could have been better. ACRA and MDDI should have acted more quickly to ascertain the key facts, and ACRA should have disabled its People Search function sooner.

Agencies should have placed greater emphasis on assessing whether the manner and extent to which NRIC numbers were being disclosed was appropriate, while clarifying the interpretations of the July circular.

Communication with the public could also be improved. "In hindsight, the Government should have made clear to the public at the outset that moving away from the use of partial NRIC numbers did not automatically mean using full NRIC numbers in every case, nor was it the Government’s intention to disclose full NRIC numbers on a large scale," the report said.

"Doing so would have helped to reassure the public that NRIC numbers remain personal data, which should only be collected, used or disclosed when there is a need to do so."

https://www.channelnewsasia.com/singapore/no-deliberate-wrongdoing-unmasking-nric-numbers-acra-mddi-4970921

Over 500,000 searches made in 5-day period when Acra’s new Bizfile portal had full NRICs available

SINGAPORE - More than 500,000 searches for individuals were made on the Bizfile portal during the five-day period from Dec 9 to 13 when full NRIC numbers were made available.

This is much higher than the usual daily traffic of 2,000 to 3,000 queries made through the portal’s free People Search function, said Second Minister for Finance Indranee Rajah in Parliament on Jan 8, citing investigations thus far.

The new Bizfile portal, managed by the Accounting and Corporate Regulatory Authority (Acra), was launched on Dec 9. Members of the public began voicing their concerns about the disclosure of the NRIC numbers on Dec 12.

The authorities temporarily disabled the search function on the night of Dec 13.

Ms Indranee said the bulk of the queries on the new portal were made on Dec 13. These came from an estimated 28,000 IP addresses, most of which were from Singapore, she added.

She was responding in a ministerial statement to questions from MPs on the incident, which had unfolded in mid-December.

Ahead of the sitting in January, MPs including Mr Dennis Tan (Hougang) and Dr Tan Wu Meng (Jurong GRC) had asked about the number of searches conducted, the number of distinct users who conducted the searches, as well as the number of NRIC numbers that were disclosed before the search function was disabled.

They also asked about the risk that NRIC numbers had been accessed by malicious actors.

In response, Ms Indranee said the authorities are unable to identify the exact number of NRIC numbers disclosed through the queries, as the Bizfile portal is not configured to track individual queries for its People Search function.

She added that Acra and GovTech had conducted a security review and identified that the security feature in the People Search function, designed to distinguish between human users and computer bots, was “not working as intended”.

This has since been fixed, she said.

“Thus far, we have not uncovered any known threat actors, based on the IP addresses that were used to make the People Search queries between Dec 9 and 13, 2024,” said Ms Indranee.

Following the incident, Acra is reviewing how its People Search function can be improved, she said.

For example, it is considering the rollout of additional search parameters, such as the Unique Entity Number (UEN) of the entity with which the individual is associated.

The People Search service has since resumed on Dec 28, with search results no longer showing any NRIC numbers, whether masked or unmasked.

Ms Indranee stressed that Acra’s database does not contain information on all Singapore citizens, but only on individuals who are or have been involved in Acra-registered entities.

These include companies, partnerships, as well as non-profit organisations that are companies limited by guarantee.

She also laid out steps that those worried that their NRIC numbers had been accessed can take to protect themselves.

First, they should ensure their NRIC numbers are not used as a password for any of their digital accounts, and change it as soon as possible if so.

Second, they should not use their NRIC numbers for authentication.

Third, they should not assume someone to be a legitimate authority even if they know their NRIC number.

“Even if someone can recite your full NRIC number, it would be prudent to ascertain their identity and intent by conducting other checks,” she said.

https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/politics/over-500000-searches-made-in-5-day-period-when-acras-new-bizfile-portal-had-full-nrics-available

Folks are now baying for Jo Teo's blood🤭

https://www.change.org/p/resignation-of-digital-development-cybersecurity-minister-josephine-teo

Since one's NRIC no. ain't a secret no more, here's Lee Hsien Loong's.

ACRA’s current chief executive Chia-Tern Huey Min has been on the job for only 9 months thus far?

Appearing genuinely contrite is an art form she has yet to master. Try harder next time, Jo Cunt.

Look what I just leeceived:

A torrid December for the PAP: transparency, trust, and truth under scrutiny

One teenage rite of passage for Singaporeans is the process of registering for a national registration identity card (NRIC), a physical manifestation of the bond between state and citizen. An adult rite is the act of moving into your own space. The sense of pride, safety and trust through citizenship under a forward-thinking and responsive government, alongside access to affordable housing in a fair and equitable market, have been two quintessential elements of being Singaporean since independence. Yet, two separate incidents in the past week have exposed their respective decay. And together they point to the increasing incompetence and short-sightedness of the ruling People’s Action Party (PAP).

First was the revelation that society should no longer consider NRIC numbers as sensitive and private. Consider the relationships the card mediates between an individual and others, between one’s personhood and the imagined community and state. On each person’s NRIC is printed a name, race, date of birth, sex, address, and an identity number. The NRIC accompanies one throughout life—school, employment, banking and telco services, office visitor registration—in the process reifying the markers through which the state gazes and the gaze is felt. 

The only really unique identifier on the NRIC is the eight-digit alphanumeric. Guard it, keep it safe, utter its digits only when necessary. In 2018, the Personal Data Protection Commission (PDPC) announced that from September 2019, organisations would generally not be allowed to unnecessarily collect, use, or disclose the number where the law does not require it. (The government was exempt.) Among other warnings in its advisory guidelines, PDPC said: “Indiscriminate or negligent handling of NRIC numbers increases the risk of unintended disclosure with the result that NRIC numbers may be obtained and used for illegal activities such as identity theft and fraud.” The NRIC number is sacred, Singaporeans concluded.

We were wrong. Let’s recount the events that led to yesterday’s extraordinary press conference. Last Thursday, Bertha Henson, a former journalist turned acerbic social media commentator, revealed the ease with which a visitor to the Accounting and Corporate Regulatory Authority (ACRA) website could access Singaporeans’ NRIC numbers.

A security flaw? Don’t be silly. It was all part of the plan. On Saturday, the Ministry of Digital Development and Information (MDDI), which manages PDPC, said that it had always intended to “unmask” NRIC numbers, “after explaining the issue and preparing the ground”. Masking had apparently offered a false sense of security about the numbers. But before the government had had a chance to conduct “a public education effort”, ACRA had acted preemptively by updating its Bizfile system. “As a unique identifier, the NRIC number is assumed to be known, just as our real names are known.” Duh. Why would you think otherwise?

The patronising tone suggested, once again, that we are daft subjects led by rulers light-years ahead. There was an apology for ACRA’s mistake, but not a hint of contrition about the mixed messaging.

PDPC, 2018: NRIC numbers obtained can be used illegally for identity theft and fraud.MDDI, 2024: Your NRIC number, like your name, is assumed to be known by all.

Ironically, for a statement arguing for transparency with one’s name and NRIC number, not a single civil servant or politician put their name to it. “[T]o be attributed to MDDI spokesperson,” it said, in the typically cold, Orwellian, cover-backside language of late-stage PAP. Across social media, many Singaporeans said they felt gaslit. 

In digital security parlance, the two relevant concepts are Identification (Who are you?) and Authentication (Are you who you say you are?). The NRIC number should ideally fulfil only the former—think of it as your digital name—but not the latter, which is perhaps best served by biometrics such as fingerprints. Unfortunately, partly because of Singapore’s inconsistent approach to digital security, individuals and organisations may still be using it for both Identification and Authentication, something alluded to on Monday by Ho Ching, former boss of Temasek, in her otherwise chest-thumping apologia for this brouhaha. (Unlike her elected comrades at the PAP, the unelected Ho is, pity our ears, not shy one.)

This incident has unleashed a wave of fear across society. Have hackers now gained access to Singaporeans’ NRIC numbers? Has it become easier to produce fake Singaporean NRICs? Can others access your housing, banking, and telco records with your NRIC number? Are Singaporeans, already prone to scams, now at even greater risk? What are the implications for Singpass, which partly relies on one’s IC number? (Ho’s son, Li Hongyi, was until recently director of Singpass.) Private sector businesses, who’ve invested in IT security to ensure their customers’ NRIC numbers are protected, must be fuming at the apparent double standards.

This debacle has also, perhaps more than any other in recent memory, exposed the tepidness and obsequiousness of Singapore’s mainstream media (MSM). First, it took a citizen journalist earning nothing to expose potential harm, another sign that highly paid MSM editors are blinkered when it comes to journalism involving their political paymasters. Even after Henson pointed it out, the MSM hasn’t properly called out the government’s 2018 to 2024 flip flop, instead mostly regurgitating MDDI talking points. 

Meanwhile, last Saturday The Online Citizen reported that the PDPC had removed the PDF of its 2018 guidelines altogether from its website, citing the need for “updates”. Soon after, the doc was again available, with the briefest of acknowledgements about recent events, indicating that an update is on the way, but in the meantime the prevailing guidelines still apply. And thus the 2018 PDPC - 2024 MDDI contradiction remains. Damage control, like the entire botched unmasking journey that precipitated it, has shown “Whole of Government” to be camouflage for Hole in Government.

It’s the biggest challenge thus far facing Lawrence Wong, new prime minister, and his 4G leadership team. Yesterday late afternoon, almost four days after Ho first spoke, they finally got their heads out of the sand. A press conference featured: Josephine Teo, MDDI’s embattled minister already reeling from numerous public gaffes; Indranee Rajah, second minister for finance; and Chia-Tern Huey Min, ACRA’s boss.

The blame, of course, fell on ACRA and Chia-Tern—misunderstanding an earlier MDDI circular, about ceasing the use of masked numbers, to mean it’s okay to expose them fully. Teo clarified what she sees as “two levels” of confusion in society: the unmasking is actually an internal government imperative but not one for the private sector; and guidelines for the private sector haven’t changed since 2018. She didn’t address the glaring contradiction in messaging that remains. As we have come to expect, she delivered long word-salad explanations, and non-apologies that seemed more to chide citizens for their anxiety and confusion.

What’s still unclear, however, is the universe of Singaporeans whose NRIC numbers were exposed through ACRA. Henson’s initial posts, verified by readers, suggested that even Singaporeans without any business dealing were on the database. A Business Times article last Friday morning said they are “likely [emphasis added] to be shareholders or directors” of locally registered firms. Yesterday Chia-Tern, reading from a script, said that only “company directors and shareholders” are involved; while Indranee, also reading from a script, said that it’s limited to people who “had made a filing with ACRA to become a company director or already are a company director”. Which is it? Lagi confusion.

One might argue that there’s nothing surprising about arrogance, elitism, flip-flopping, obfuscation, and media sycophancy in the PAP’s Singapore—voters will just suck it up. Yet a key part of our social compact—trading in civil and political liberties for growth and stability—was the blind faith that the PAP would always keep us safe. This can no longer be taken for granted. In an era of rampant identity theft globally, and in a country with a patchy record for digital security, this NRIC incident is a colossal failure.

Separately on Monday, in an incident that also sheds light on identity and transparency, two ministers, K Shanmugam and Tan See Leng, threatened legal action over a Bloomberg article about transactions of so-called good class bungalows (GCBs), the most premium segment in Singapore’s property market. For those worried about the huge recent influx of foreign wealth into our tiny city—with all its implications for inequality, cost of living, and possible financial improprieties—the revelations were damning.

The value of GCBs transacted this year was at least an eye-watering S$1.1bn. Almost half of them by value didn’t include legal filings that would offer transparency on the owners’ identities and other details. Many of these exorbitant mansions have been snapped up by naturalised Singaporeans originally from China. For instance, the year’s biggest deal saw Xiang Yangyang, daughter of Chinese nickel billionaire Xiang Guangda, buying a 2,612 sq m (28,115 sq ft) property for S$84m—an astronomical profit for its (unnamed) seller, who paid S$37.6m for it in 2020. The three PAP ministers mentioned in the article are Shanmugam, Tan, and Mah Bow Tan, a former minister who sold his mansion for S$50m to a China-born Singapore citizen last year.

The inequity of housing and space is an increasing liability for the PAP. The euphoria felt by millionaire landowners in a frothy GCB market contrasts sharply with the financial anxiety that grips those in the public housing market. (Depicted by Jonathan Lin in “Affordability in the lion city: is Singapore’s public housing model built to last?”) Rich Singaporeans who own private freehold properties, including all those GCBs, will be able to pass them onto their kids (with no inheritance tax), their values presumably rising perpetually. Most of the other Singaporeans who own 99-year leasehold properties—the vast majority of homeowners—effectively own assets whose values will rise but then start to decline, and will eventually be worth nothing. 

In a Facebook post, Shanmugam said that Tan and him would be taking action against Bloomberg and “others who have also published libellous statements about those transactions”. We’ll eventually find out details of the alleged libel, though the Bloomberg article remains live at the time of writing. 

The risk for Shanmugam and Tan is with optics: some Singaporeans might wonder if they are trying to mask any alleged business dealings. Unlike many democracies, Singapore does not require public asset declarations from its politicians. In the wake of the NRIC incident, one meme poked fun at the inanity of what’s considered classified here: every Singaporean’s NRIC number can be revealed, apparently, but not Ho’s then salary at Temasek. 

Shrouded in secrecy too, of course, are the identities of buyers of many plum properties. Through the government’s Integrated Land Information Service (INLIS), one can obtain property ownership and other land information—but not if, for instance, the buyers have used shell companies or trusts to hide their identities, as Bloomberg said more are doing. Who in this country has the right to privacy, to be obscured, to be forgotten? Why can some linger at the dark edges of what Kimberly Kay Hoang called Spiderweb Capitalism? Some identities are seemingly more sacred than others.

Shanmugam and Tan’s current legal action could thus be perceived negatively, particularly given the broader global push for greater financial transparency. There’s a risk that they themselves drift closer, in the public’s eye, to the plutocrats that the PAP has so assiduously courted over the years.

Are PAP ministers more concerned about the interests of this global elite or ordinary Singaporeans? With which group do they have more in common? These questions have been slowly percolating through society since the PAP fully embarked on its global city drive in the 2000s. Amidst the class angst is a growing sense of disaffection with leaders. None of this portends a significant swing away from the PAP at the next general election, due by November 2025. The Singaporean voter is notoriously risk-averse, picking up on PAP iniquities and smarting from its condescension between elections, only to fall back into its presumed protective embrace at the next ballot.

Power, as we know, will never relinquish its grip quietly. Following Shanmugam’s post was one from Calvin Cheng, a former nominated member of Parliament who, like Ho, is a dependable social media apparatchik. Cheng said he’s “upset that foreign media is sowing discord in Singapore” by “inciting class envy” and “inciting anti foreigner sentiment”. Cheng blamed Bloomberg for spreading “conspiracy theories”.

It’s an old trick. In a grossly unequal society, the powerful will deploy rabble-rousing language in the hope that nationalist fervour blinds people to the existing structural injustices, numbs them from the unrelenting stress of holding up a system whose spoils are unevenly shared. Perhaps the most telling statement in the article was from a senior lawyer, who told Bloomberg that some Chinese buyers are exploring purchases with the “anticipation of obtaining Singapore citizenship in the very near future.” This is a week, then, that actually sharpened the contours of that nebulous Singaporean identity. One day, the number you were assigned is sacred; the next, it’s everybody’s business. One day citizenship, belonging, and the very earth on which we stand are protected; the next, they’re possibly up for sale to the highest bidder.

From the land that binds us to our past to the digital realm where our future lies, Singaporeanness is very much about forgoing your personhood and submitting yourself to the whims of an impersonal, global, capitalist order. We’re each but a droplet tossed and turned in the turbulent ocean of financial liquidity. 

Your rites of passage, it turns out, are really not about you.

https://www.jom.media/a-torrid-december-for-the-pap-transparency-trust-and-truth-under-scrutiny/

I would be worried if Josexfiend Teo is actually good-for-something

https://www.theonlinecitizen.com/2024/12/20/governments-backtracking-on-nric-unmasking-and-the-miscommunication-excuse/

The Ah Longs ain't gonna be too happy about this NRIC unmasking affair either :P

An independent COI must be convened ASAP to determine how this FUBAR erupted ever so "spectacularly".

Looks like she will be taking home the 最佳女主角 accolade once again next year 🏆

See? That wasn't so difficult was it? 😎

Apology not accepted, please go commit harakiri right away.

PAP enacted the Personal Protection Data Act in 2012, yet backtracks and now wants to pursue data UNPROTECTION for the masses, really is ownself slap ownself

www.channelnewsasia.com

People raised privacy concerns after the new Bizfile portal published people's full NRIC numbers for free in its search results. ACRA had moved ahead with the unmasking before the government's education campaign, say authorities.